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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we analyse how a peer-to-peer sharing platform
should price its service (when imagined as an excludable public
good) to maximize profit, when each user’s participation adds value
to the platform service by creating a positive externality to other
participants. To characterize network externalities as a function
of the number of participants, we consider different bounded and
unbounded user utility models. The bounded utility model fits many
infrastructure sharing applications with bounded network value,
in which complete coverage has a finite user valuation (e.g., WiFi
or hotspot). The unbounded utility model fits the large scale data
sharing and explosion in social media, where it is expected that the
network value follows Metcalfe’s or Zipf’s law. For both models, we
analyze the optimal pricing schemes to select heterogeneous users
in the platform under complete and incomplete information of users’
service valuations. We propose the concept of price of information
(PoI) to characterize the profit loss due to lack of information, and
present provable PoI bounds for different utility models. We show
that the PoI = 2 for the bounded utility model, meaning that just
half of profit is lost, whereas the PoI ≥ 2 for the unbounded utility
model and increases as for a less concave utility function. We also
show that the complicated differentiated pricing scheme which is
optimal under incomplete user information, can be replaced by a
single uniform price scheme that is asymptotic optimal. Finally, we
extend our pricing schemes to a two-sided market by including a
new group of ‘pure’ service users contributing no externalities, and
show that the platform may charge zero price to the original group
of users in order to attract the pure user group.
1 INTRODUCTION
Due to advances in wireless technology and more powerful mo-
bile devices (e.g., smartphones), it is common today that when users
join a peer-to-peer sharing platform they not only enjoy the pro-
vided service but also contribute to the service’s value. There are
roughly two types of peer-to-peer sharing platforms: infrastructure
and content sharing [10]. The former type of platforms allows users
to cooperate and contribute physical resources to create networking
or computing services. For example, FON is aWiFi sharing platform
whose user opens its home WiFi connection to the community and
can access the others’ WiFi access points [8]. The latter type of
platforms includes online social media (e.g., WeChat, WhatsApp),
where platform users create and share massive content with each
other and their number has reached 1.6 billion in 2014. The global
revenue of such peer-to-peer sharing platforms is fast growing and
is expected to increase to US$40 billions by 2022 [9]. How to price
∗Part of the results will appear in the Proceedings of NetEcon’18.
their services for selected users under network externalities is a
key question for such profit-maximizing platforms.
Peer-to-peer sharing economy of such excludable public goods
has been widely studied in the recent literature. [1] and [5] study
how to address the incentive issues for efficient sharing in peer-
to-peer networks via mechanism design. Courcourbetis and We-
ber in [4] study pricing of an infrastructure-sharing platform (e.g.,
peer-to-peer file sharing) and find the network value (profit) in an
asymptotic sense and find that network value/profit is bounded
when each user randomly caches and shares a subset of distinct
files. Metcalfe and Zipf’s laws study the network value for the so-
cial media platforms, showing the service value to an individual
increases super-linearly with the total user number and is thus
unbounded [2]. In [8], [10] and [7], users’ dual modes (i.e., contrib-
utors and consumers) are considered and optimal pricing schemes
for network externalities is designed under complete information.
Assuming full information of users’ private utilities, [3] investigates
the optimal pricing according to the network structure, and pro-
poses a simplified approximation using uniform pricing, i.e. every
users sees the same price. [6] further consider that the network
externalities can be positive or negative, affecting the final pricing
design. Different from these works, we consider the challenging
scenario of incomplete information for optimal pricing design of ex-
cludable public goods, and study the feasibility to employ a simple
pricing approach for profit maximization (without users’ reporting
of private information as in VCG auction). The newly proposed
concept, price of information is unique to characterize the profit
loss due to lack of information.
Our main contributions and key novelty are summarised as
follows.
• We study the optimal pricing for a peer-to-peer sharing
platform under incomplete information, by considering both
the infrastructure and content sharing applications (with
bounded and unbounded network externalities, see Section
2). The platform is profit-maximizing and designs pricing to
include target users to contribute to the excludable public
goods.
• For both bounded and unbounded user utility models, we
analyze the optimal pricing schemes to select heterogeneous
users in the platform under complete and incomplete infor-
mation of users’ service valuations. We propose the concept
of price of information, which is defined as the ratio of profits
under complete and incomplete information, to characterize
the profit loss due to lack of information, and present prov-
able PoI bounds for different utility models. We prove that
the PoI = 2 for the bounded utility model, meaning that just
half of profit is lost. For a general unbounded utility model,
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we prove the PoI is in the interval [2, 27/8], that is, PoI is at
least 2 and is greater for a less concave utility function.
• We simplify the complicated differentiated pricing scheme
under incomplete information, by replacing it by a single
uniform price. The uniform price mechanism does not need
users to report their private information of service valuations
and achieves asymptotical optimality as user number goes to
infinity for both bounded and unbounded user utility models.
• We extend our pricing schemes to a two-sided market by
including a new group of ‘pure’ service users contributing
no externalities. We show that the platform needs to decide
different pricing to different groups of users and may charge
zero price to the original group of users in order to attract the
pure user group. We prove that the uniform pricing scheme
is still asymptotically optimal as user number goes to infinity
and that PoI increases as the fraction of original group of
users decreases.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a peer-to-peer platform who wants to maximize its
profit. It faces a set of potential users N = {1, . . . ,n} who choose
to participate in the subscribing to the platform service or not.
Define binary variable πi = 1 or 0 , telling that user i will or
will not participate. The vector π = (π1, . . . ,πn ) summarizes all
users’ participation decisions. The total service value is denoted
by ϕ(π ), which is a function of π to tell the network externalities.
Consider that each user contributes equally to the service as a public
good, then ϕ(π ) can be rewritten as a function of the number of
platform users denoted bym =
∑n
i=1 π , that is, ϕ(π ) = ϕ(m). We
will introduce the detailed formulation of bounded and unbounded
ϕ(·) in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively.
Users have heterogeneous service valuations towards the plat-
form service. Let θi be the user i’s service valuation and this is
his private information. Without loss of generality, we assume
θ1 > θ2 > · · · > θn and denote valuation vector θ = (θ1,θ2, . . . ,θn ).
The utility of a participant i is proportional to his valuation and the
total service value, that is, θiϕ(π ). The platform can charge differ-
ently for different users’ subscriptions. Let pi be the membership
fee charged to i . The payoff of user i is his utility of the total service
value minus the membership fee, that is,
ui = πi (θiϕ(π ) − pi ). (1)
The platform’s goal is to maximize its total profit and it may
not include all users. Let c be the platform cost (e.g., equipment fee
for installing an access point in WiFi sharing ) for adding a user
to access shared service with the exsiting others. The total profit,
denoted by Π, is a function of π and c as follows
Π =
∑
i ∈N
πi (pi − c). (2)
2.1 Bounded User Utility Model
In an infrastructure sharing platform, the service coverage or
value is bounded (e.g., by 100% citywide), nomatter howmany users
participate. Thus, user utility function is bounded in this model. For
modelling bounded ϕ(m), take WiFi sharing in a finite region of a
normalized unit square surface for example. n users are randomly
distributed in the square and each user can cover a circle of radius
r (0 < r << 1) or an area πr2. The total coverage depends on the
total user numberm. For an arbitrary point in the square surface,
the probability that it is not covered by a single user is ρ = 1 − πr2
and the probability that it is not covered by them users is ρm . That
is,
ϕ(m) = 1 − ρm ,
which is bounded by 1 and is concavely increasing inm. We can
rewrite user i’s payoff (1) as follows,
ui = πi (θi (1 − ρ
∑
j∈N πj ) − pi ). (3)
In Section 3, we will focus on this bounded utility model and anal-
yse the optimal pricing schemes under complete and incomplete
information.
2.2 Unbounded User Utility Model
In an online social media, user utility increases super-linearly
with the number of users, following Metcalfe’s or Zipf’s laws. Met-
calfe’s law suggests that a user will get equal benefits from the other
m − 1 participants. The user’s utility is proportional tom and when
m is sufficiently large, ϕ(m) ≈m [2]. Zipf’s law suggests that a user
will benefit from the others differently, in inverse proportion to the
frequency with which he interacts with(i.e., frequency 1/i with the
i-th closest user amongm users). Then ϕ(m) = ∑m−1i=1 (1/m) ≈ logm
[2]. As a result, user i’s payoff (1) becomes,
ui =

πi (θi log(
∑
j
πj ) − pi ) , if Zipf’s law; (4)
πi (θi (
∑
j
πj ) − pi ) , if Metcalfe’s law. (5)
3 OPTIMAL PRICING FOR BOUNDED
UTILITY MODEL
In this section, we will analyse the platform’s pricing strategy
for bounded user utility ϕ(m) = 1 − ρm .
3.1 Pricing under Complete Information
Under complete information about all users’ valuations θi ’s, the
platform’s optimization problem is to choose prices pi ’s and control
admission πi ’s to maximize its profit. The payoff of a participant in
(3) cannot be negative, otherwise he will choose not to participate.
Formally, the problem is
max
{(πi , pi ), i ∈N }
∑
i ∈N
πi (pi − c)
s. t. πi
(
θi (1 − ρ
∑
j πj ) − pi
)
≥ 0, for all i ∈ N . (6)
At optimality, the constraints in problem (6) are tight. For any user
with πi = 1 or 0, it is optimal to leave a zero payoff to him by setting
the price to be
p∗i (π ) = θi (1 − ρ
∑
j πj ).
This result helps simplify problem (6) to
max
{πi , i ∈N }
∑
i ∈N
πi
(
θi (1 − ρ
∑
j πj ) − c
)
. (7)
To help solve this problem, we start with a lemma about the plat-
form’s preference among users.
Lemma 1. At the optimality of problem (7), for any two users
i, j ∈ N with θi > θ j , if user j is included in the platform (i.e., πj = 1),
then user i should also be included (πi = 1).
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It follows from Lemma 1 that the platform will selectm users
with the largest service valuations and problem (7) reduces to
max
m∈N
(
(1 − ρm )
m∑
i=1
θi −mc
)
. (8)
This problem’s objective function is not a monotonic function
ofm and it is not possible to derive closed-form solution ofm. Yet
we can use the efficient one-dimensional search method to find the
optimalm numerically.
3.2 Pricings under Incomplete Information
Under incomplete information, the platform does not know θi ’s
exactly but their distributions. We assume θi ’s are independent
and identically distributed on [0, 1] with cumulative distribution
function F . The cost is comparable and we have c ∈ (0, 1). We will
derive a optimal (differentiated) pricing scheme and then propose a
uniform pricing scheme as approximation. We will compare these
two different pricing schemes asymptotically.
3.2.1 Optimal/Differentiated Pricing Scheme. Under incomplete
information, the platform will require each user i to declare his θi .
Given the θi ’s (may or may not be truthful) declared by the users,
the platform should choose pi ’s and πi ’s as functions of the θi ’s
distribution to maximize its profit, i.e.,
max
πi (·), pi (·)
Eθ
( n∑
i=1
πi (θ )(pi (θ ) − c)
)
(9)
subject to
Eθ−i
(
πi (θi ,θ−i )
(
θi (1 − ρ
∑
j πj (θi ,θ−i )) − pi (θi ,θ−i )
))
≥ 0, (10)
Eθ−i
(
πi (θi ,θ−i )
(
θi (1 − ρ
∑
j πj (θi ,θ−i )) − pi (θi ,θ−i )
))
≥ Eθ−i
(
πi (θ ′i ,θ−i )
(
θi (1 − ρ
∑
j πj (θi ,θ−i )) − pi (θ ′i ,θ−i )
))
, (11)
for all i and θ ′i ,
where θ−i = (θ1, · · · ,θi−1,θi+1, · · · ,θn ) is a vector consists of all
the users’ valuations except θi . Constraint (10) is to ensure indi-
vidual rationality or participation, i.e., user i’s expected payoff
conditional on θ−i is nonnegative, and constraint (11) is to ensure
incentive compatibility, i.e., user i must declare his valuation truth-
fully.
Let us define three functions:
д(θi ) = θi − 1 − F (θi )
f (θi ) , (12)
Vi (θi ) =
∫
πi (θi ,θ−i )(1 − ρ
∑
j πj (θi ,θ−i ))dFn−1(θ−i ), (13)
Pi (θi ) =
∫
πi (θi ,θ−i )pi (θi ,θ−i )dFn−1(θ−i ). (14)
Note that θiVi (θi ) and Pi (θi ) are the expected utility and expected
payment of user i given his valuation reportθi , respectively. Assume
that д is a nondecreasing function as in the literature of mechanism
design. Intuitively, д(θi ) is less than θi to give users incentives to
truthfully report their θi ’s in the incomplete information scenario.
We let д(θ(i)) be the ith greatest among д(θ1), . . . ,д(θn ), then we
have д(θ(1)) ≥ · · · ≥ д(θ(n)). The following lemma helps simplify
the constraints in problem (9).
Proposition 2 (Necessary and sufficient for incentive
compatibility). Vi (θi ) is non-decreasing in θi , and the differentiated
pricing Pi (θi ) is given by,
Pi (θi ) = θiVi (θi ) −
∫ θi
0
Vi (η)dη. (15)
As a result, the platform’s maximal profit, denoted by ΠD , in (9) can
be written as∫
max
m∈N
(
(1 − ρm )
m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) −mc
)
dFn (θ ). (16)
The proof is given in Appendix A. Proposition 2 indicates that at
the optimum, the platform will includem users whose д(θi )’s are
the greatest.
3.2.2 Uniform Pricing Scheme As Approximation. Although the
differentiated pricing mechanism in (15) is optimal, it is complicated
to compute and implement in practice. While it guarantees that
truthful reporting is the best response for users , it is difficult for a
user to check (11) for any θ ′i and θ−i . Next, we propose a uniform
pricing scheme which does not even require users to declare their
θ ’s.
In this simple scheme, the platform announces a single price P to
users without any admission control. As users are i.i.d. distributed,
there is a common valuation threshold θ¯ for subscription decision-
making and θ¯ depends on P . User i will decide subscription by
comparing his θi to θ¯ and participates if θi ≥ θ¯ . Approximately
m = n(1 − F (θ¯ )) users will finally subscribe and contribute to the
network externalities.. User i’s payoff in (3) becomes
ui = θi
(
1 − ρn(1−F (θ¯ ))) − P ≥ 0, for all θi ≥ θ¯ .
This should be zero for an indifferent user with θi = θ¯ . Thus,
P = θ¯
(
1 − ρn(1−F (θ¯ ))), (17)
which is a function of θ¯ , or we can equivalently express θ¯ as a
function of P . The platform’s optimization problem is
max
θ¯
n(1 − F (θ¯ ))θ¯ (1 − ρn(1−F (θ¯ ))) − n(1 − F (θ¯ ))c . (18)
Since each θi follows the uniform distribution on [0, 1], problem
(18) becomes
max
θ¯
n(1 − θ¯ )θ¯ (1 − ρn(1−θ¯ )) − n(1 − θ¯ )c (19)
The uniform pricing problem (though non-convex) can be solved
efficiently via an one-dimensional search. We next present the ana-
lytical results as n →∞ and characterize the network value/profit.
Theorem 3. Given users’ bounded utility model in (3), as n →∞,
the optimal uniform price under incomplete information is P∗ → 1+c2 ,
the optimal user threshold is θ¯∗ → 1+c2 and the maximal profit is
ΠU ∼ ( 1−c2 )2n. As n → ∞, the maximum profit achieved by the
differentiated pricing scheme in (15) is ΠD ∼ ( 1−c2 )2n. Thus, uniform
pricing is asymptotically optimal, i.e., lim
n→∞
ΠU
ΠD
→ 1.
The proof is given in Appendix B. Theorem 3 shows that uni-
form pricing scheme’s profit grows at the same rate with n as the
differentiated pricing scheme.
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3.2.3 Price of Information. Now we are ready to compare the
expected maximal profits under complete and incomplete infor-
mation. We define price of information (PoI) as the ratio of the
expected maximal profit under complete and incomplete informa-
tion as n →∞, i.e.,
PoI = lim
n→∞
Eθ (Π)
ΠU
. (20)
PoI is of course similar in concept to the well-known idea of Price
of Anarchy. However, the second refers to the social welfare that is
lost when users act self-interestedly vis-a-vis for the community.
Note that price discounts are given as incentives under incomplete
information, and the profit is greater under complete information.
Thus, PoI ≥ 1. One can also replace ΠU by ΠD in (20) without
changing the PoI value, according to the uniform pricing’s asymp-
totic optimality in Theorem 3.
Proposition 4. Given users’ bounded utility model in (3), the
price of information is PoI = 2.
The proof is given in Appendix C. We note that PoI does not
depend on parameter ρ. Recall that ρ tells the service coverage
contributed by an individual user. As n goes to infinity, the total
bounded coverage is fixed to 100% , and hence ρ has no impact on
PoI .
4 OPTIMAL PRICING FOR UNBOUNDED
UTILITY MODEL
In this section, we will analyse the platform’s pricing strategy
for unbounded user utility ϕ(m) = logm .
4.1 Pricing under Complete Information
Assume user’s utility is given by (4), which follows from Zipf’s
law. Similar to Section 3.1, it is optimal to leave a zero payoff to
user i by setting the price to be
p∗i (π ) = θi log(
∑
i
πi ).
The platform’s optimization problem is
max
{πi , i ∈N }
∑
i ∈N
πi
(
θi log(
∑
j ∈N
πj ) − c
)
. (21)
Lemma 1 still holds here, the problem reduces to
max
m∈N
(
logm
m∑
i=1
θi −mc
)
. (22)
Thus, similarly, the platform will selectm users with the largest
service valuations and we can use one-dimensional search to find
the optimalm.
4.2 Pricings under Incomplete Information
Inherit the same logic from Section 3.2, We will derive a optimal
(differentiated) pricing scheme and then propose a uniform pricing
scheme as approximation. We will compare these two different
pricing schemes asymptotically.
4.2.1 Optimal/Differentiated Pricing Scheme. The platform’s op-
timization problem in differentiated pricing scheme is the same
as (9)-(11) except service value (1 − ρ
∑
j πj (θi ,θ−i )) is replaced by
log(∑nj=1 πj (θi ,θ−i )).We can similarly defineд(θi ),Vi (θi ), and P(θi )
as in (12), (13), and (14). Then Proposition 2 still holds here, and
similar to (16), the platform’s maximal profit can be written as∫
max
m∈N
(
logm
m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) −mc
)
dFn (θ ). (23)
This indicates that at the optimum, the platform will includem
users whose д(θi )’s are the greatest.
4.2.2 Uniform Pricing Scheme as Approximation. Now we anal-
yse the uniform pricing mechanism. Similar to Section 3.2.2, the
payoff should be zero for an indifferent user with θi = θ¯ . Thus,
similar to (17), we have
P = θ¯ log
(
n(1 − F (θ¯ )),
and the platform’s optimization problem is
max
θ¯
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )n log(n(1 − θ¯ )) − n(1 − θ¯ )c . (24)
The uniform pricing problem (though non-convex) can be solved
efficiently via an one-dimensional search. We next present the ana-
lytical results as n →∞ and characterize the network value/profit.
Theorem 5. Given users’ unbounded utility model in (4), as n →
∞, the optimal uniform price under incomplete information is P∗ →
1
2 log
n
2 , the optimal user threshold is θ¯
∗ → 12 and the maximal profit
is ΠU ∼ n4 log(n2 ). As n →∞, the maximum profit achieved by the
differentiated pricing scheme is ΠD ∼ n4 log(n2 ). Therefore, uniform
pricing is asymptotically optimal, i.e., lim
n→∞
ΠU
ΠD
→ 1.
The proof is given in Appendix D. Note that the cost c does not
play a role in the optimal price or maximal profit. This is because
when utility is unbounded, as n →∞, the user’s perceived network
value grows super-linearly with the number of participants, while
the cost only grows linearly and is negligible.
We next also consider Metcalfe’s law rather than Zipf’s law and
ϕ(m) = m as a less concave function than loд(m) . Then user i’s
payoff is now given by (5) and we can prove similar results as
Theorem 5 below. The proof is given in Appendix E.
Corollary 6. Given users’ unbounded utility model in (5), as
n →∞, the optimal uniform price under incomplete information is
P∗ → (2/9)n, the optimal user threshold θ¯∗ = 1/3, and the maximal
profit is ΠU ∼ (4/27)n2. As n → ∞, the maximum profit achieved
by the differentiated pricing scheme is ΠD ∼ (4/27)n2. Therefore,
uniform pricing is asymptotically optimal, i.e., lim
n→∞
ΠU
ΠD
→ 1.
4.2.3 Price of Information. We can still define price of informa-
tion by (20). We more generally consider users’ payoff function (not
limited to (4) and (5)) as follows,
ui = θiv(m) − pi , (25)
wherev(m) is an unbounded, increasing and concave function with
v(0) = 0. Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Given users’ general unbounded utility model in
(25), the price of information is PoI ∈ [2, 27/8]. More specifically, if
users’ utility model follows Zipf’s law in (4), PoI = 2. If users’ utility
model follows Metcalfe’s law in (5), PoI = 27/8.
4
The proof is given in Appendix F. As the utility function be-
comes more concave (fromm in Metcalfe’s law to loд(m) in Zipf’s
law), the profit loss due to lack of information decreases since the
network externality decreases and there is less consumer surplus
to be transformed to platform’s profit. This holds true for a general
cumulative distribution function F .
5 PRICING EXTENSION TO A TWO-SIDED
MARKET
In this section, we include another group/type of users to the
platform, who are simply consumers and do not contribute to the
network externalities . Denote the set of original users (both con-
tributors and consumers) as N1 = {1, 2, · · · ,n1}, and the new user
set by N2 = {n1+1, · · · ,n1+n2}. Within each set, we reorder users
according to their service valuations such that θ1 > · · · > θn1 and
θn1+1 > · · · > θn1 + n2. Note that to which set a user belongs is
public information as it is easy to verify whether a user can con-
tribute or not. However, within each set, users’ service valuations
are still private information. As the two user sets’ subscriptions
affect each other, we wonder how the platform should jointly decide
pricing schemes to the two sets of users. We also wonder if we can
still approximate the two user groups’ differentiated pricing via
two uniform prices to achieve asymptotic optimality. The pricing
schemes considered in Sections 3 and 4 can be similarly applied to
the two sets of users. However, the asymptotical analysis becomes
challenging as dimension increases.
Without much loss of generality, we apply Metcalfe’s law here,
where ϕ(m) =m andm only counts the original users in N1 who
can contribute.
5.1 Pricing under Complete Information
Similar to Section 3.1, it is optimal to leave a zero payoff to user
i of any user set by setting the price to be
p∗i (π ) = θi
∑
j ∈N1
πj .
The platform’s optimization problem is
max
{πi , i ∈N }
∑
i ∈N
πi
(
θi
∑
j ∈N1
πj − c
)
Similar to Lemma 1, at the optimality of problem (26), for any two
users i, j ∈ N1 or i, j ∈ N2 with θi > θ j , if user j is included (i.e.,
πj = 1), then user i should also be included (πi = 1). It follows that
the platform will selectm1 users with the largest service valuations
in N1 andm2 users with the largest service valuations in N2 and
problem (26) reduces to
max
m1,m2
m1
( m1∑
i=1
θi +
n1+m2∑
i=n1+1
θi
)
− (m1 +m2)c, (26)
which is an extension of (22) for a single user set. We have the
following theorem regarding the optimal solution to (26).
Proposition 8. Let m¯2 be the largest user numberm2 such that
n1θn1+m2 ≥ c . Then if( n1∑
i=1
θi +
n1+m¯2∑
i=n1+1
θi
)
− n1 + m¯2
n1
c > 0,
then the optimal solution to (26) ism∗1 = n1 andm
∗
2 = m¯2. Otherwise,
the optimal solution to (26) ism∗1 = 0 andm
∗
2 = 0.
The proof is given in Appendix G. It is optimal to either include
all the potential contributors in the platform for the maximum
network externality or include no users due to high cost. Note that
if no user of the first set is selected, the network value is zero and
the platform cannot attract any pure user from the other set.
5.2 Pricing under Incomplete information
5.2.1 Differentiated Pricing Scheme. Under incomplete informa-
tion, the platform will require each user i of each type to declare
his θi and then choose pi ’s and πi ’s to maximize its profit. We can
similarly decide the differentiated pricing in (15) as Proposition 2
still applies, and the platform’s optimization problem can be written
as
Π =
∫
max
m1,m2
m1
( m1∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) +
n1+m2∑
i=n1+1
д(θ(i))
)
− (m1 +m2)c dFn (θ ).
5.2.2 Uniform Pricing Scheme as Approximation. Unlike the sin-
gle user type case, in the two-sided market, the platform sets dif-
ferent uniform prices for different user types. The price for type-1
users (dual-role) is P1 and and the price for type-2 user (pure con-
sumers) is P2. There is a unique threshold for each type of users: θ¯1
for type-1 and θ¯2 for type 2 . Assume θi is uniformly distributed in
[0, 1]. Similar to (17), for a type-1 user i ∈ N1 with θi = θ¯1, we have
θ¯1(1 − θ¯1)n1 = P1.
and for a type 2 user user i ∈ N2 with θi = θ¯2, we have
θ¯2(1 − θ¯1)n1 = P2.
The platform’s optimization problem can be written as
max
θ¯1, θ¯2∈[0,1]
n1(1 − θ¯1)(θ¯1(1 − θ¯1)n1)n2 − c)
+ n2(1 − θ¯2)(θ¯2(1 − θ¯1)n1 − c).
Assume n1/n2 = k where k is a positive constant, when n1 and
n2 or simply n go to infinity, we have the following proposition
regarding the optimal uniform prices and maximal profits.
Theorem 9. In two-sided market, as n → ∞, the two optimal
uniform prices under incomplete information are
P1 =

0 if n1n2 <
1
4 ,
4n1−3n2+2
√
4n21+3n1n2
36 if
n1
n2 ≥ 14 ,
P2 =

n1
2 if
n1
n2 <
1
4 ,
n1n2
4
√
4n21+3n1n2−8n1
if n1n2 ≥ 14 ,
yielding the optimal profit
ΠU =

4n21+6n22+7n1n2+(4n1+3n2)
√
4n21+3n1n2
108 if
n1
n2 <
1
4 ,
1
4n1n2 if
n1
n2 ≥ 14 .
(27)
P∗1 decreases with n1/n2, P∗2 increases with n1/n2, and ΠU increases
with n1/n2. As n → ∞, the profit achieved by the differentiated
pricing scheme isΠD ∼ (27), that is, uniform pricing is asymptotically
optimal.
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The proof is given in Appendix H. When n1/n2 is small (less
than 1/4), the platform platform’s profit comes mostly from the
type-2 pure users and desires the maximum network externalities
contributed by the type-1 users. Thus, it charges zero price to
motivate all type-1 users to contribute to the network externalities.
As n1/n2 increases, the fraction of potential contributors increases,
the platform with larger network externalities can charge more
from the pure users of type-2, while keeping more contributors of
type-1 at a lower price. Thus, P∗1 decreases and P
∗
2 increases with
n1/n2.
5.2.3 Price of Information. Similar to Section 3.2.3, we can define
price of information by (20) and straightforward calculation gives
the following theorem.
Theorem 10. In the two-sided market, the price of information is
PoI =

54(n21+n1n2)
4n21+6n22+7n1n2+(4n1+3n2)
√
4n21+3n1n2
if n1n2 <
1
4 ,
2(n1+n2)
n2 if
n1
n2 ≥ 14 .
Overall, price of information decreases as n1/n2 increases.
The proof is given in Appendix I. As n1/n2 increases, the fraction
of potential contributors increases, the platform under incomplete
information still needs to provide price discounts as incentives. As
a result, the PoI or profit loss due to lack of information increases.
6 SIMULATION RESULTS
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Figure 1: Average profit ratio between uniform and differen-
tiated pricing and price of information for bounded utility
model.
We plot ratios of average profits under different pricing schemes
in Figure 1. for bounded utility model and Figure 2. for unbounded
utility model, by averaging 1 million sample data with different θ
realizations.
Figure 1. shows that the average profit ratio between the uniform
and differentiated pricing schemes increases with user number. This
is consistent with Theorem 3, which shows uniform pricing scheme
is asymptotically optimal as n goes to infinity. The convergence
rate at which ΠU /ΠD approaches 1 decreases with ρ. As service
coverage contributed by an individual user increases (ρ decreases),
total service converges to 100% faster and hence uniform pricing
scheme approaches optimality faster. Figure 1. also shows PoI as
an decreasing function of n, approaches to 2 as in Proposition 4.
PoI decreases with n since the information of users’ valuation dis-
tribution helps pricing design of the platform more as n increases.
The convergence rate at which PoI approaches 2 increases as ρ
decreases is also due to the fact that total service converges to 100%
faster as ρ decreases.
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Figure 2: Average profit ratio between uniform and differen-
tiated pricing and price of information for unbounded util-
ity model.
Figure 2. shows that the average profit ratio between the uni-
form and differentiated pricing mechanisms increases with user
number. This is consistent with Theorem 5 and Corollary 6, which
show uniform pricing scheme is asymptotically optimal as n goes to
infinity. Logarithm utility model converges faster than linear utility
model. This is because network externalities grow faster in linear
utility model than logarithm utility model and hence uniform pric-
ing cause greater profit loss in linear utility model than logarithm
utility model. Figure 2. also shows PoI as an decreasing function of
n approaches to 2 for logarithm utility model and 27/8 (=3.375) for
linear utility model. This is consistent with Proposition 7.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper studies how a peer-to-peer sharing platform should
price its service to maximize its profit. We consider both bounded
and unbounded user utility models. For both bounded and un-
bounded user utilitymodels, we analyze the optimal pricing schemes
to select heterogeneous users in the platform under complete and
incomplete information of users’ service valuations. The profit loss
due to lack of information becomes greater as the utility function
becomes less concave. We show that the complicated differentiated
pricing scheme under incomplete information can be replaced by a
single uniform price with asymptotic optimality. We also extend
our pricing schemes to a two-sided market. Platform may charge
zero price to the original group of users in order to attract the pure
user group. Uniform pricing scheme is still asymptotically optimal
as user number goes to infinity and price of information increases
as the fraction of original users decreases.
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A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. Given (12), (13), and (14), incentive compatibility con-
straint (11) can be rewritten as follows,
θiVi (θi ) − Pi (θi ) ≥ θiVi (θ ′i ) − Pi (θ ′i ) (28)
for all i and θ ′i ∈ [0, 1]. Assume Vi (θi ) is non-decreasing in θi , and
Pi (θi ) = θiVi (θi ) −
∫ θi
0
Vi (η)dη.
Straightforward calculation shows that (28) is satisfied.
Now assume (28) holds for all i and θ ′i ∈ [0, 1]. Fix arbitrary i ,
(28) holds for any θi ∈ [0, 1] and θ ′i ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that, for any
x ,y ∈ [0, 1]
xVi (x) − Pi (x) ≥ xVi (y) − Pi (y), (29)
yVi (y) − Pi (y) ≥ yVi (x) − Pi (x). (30)
Adding (29) and (30) yields
(x − y)(Vi (x) −Vi (y)) ≥ 0.
Thus, Vi (θi ) is non-decreasing in θi . Assume x ≥ y, by definition
of Riemann integral, it follows from (29) that
xVi (x) −
∫ x
0
Vi (η)dη ≥ Pi (x),
it follows from (30) that
−xVi (x) +
∫ x
0
Vi (η)dη ≥ −Pi (x).
Then,
Pi (θi ) = θiVi (θi ) −
∫ θi
0
Vi (η)dη.
Thus, the first part of the theorem follows.
Using (15), the platform’s maximal profit ΠD can be written as
ΠD = max
πi (·), pi (·)
Eθ
( n∑
i=1
πi (θ )(pi (θ ) − c)
)
= max
πi (·)
∫ n∑
i=1
πi (θ )
(
д(θi )(1 − ρ
∑
j πj (θ )) − c
)
dFn (θ )
= max
m(·)
∫ m(θ )∑
i=1
(
д(θ(i))(1 − ρm(θ )) −m(θ )c
)
dFn (θ )
= max
m(·)
∫ (
(1 − ρm(θ ))
m(θ )∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) −m(θ )c
)
dFn (θ )
=
∫
max
m∈N
(
(1 − ρm )
m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) −mc
)
dFn (θ ).
Thus, the second part of the theorem follows. □
B PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We first prove some lemmas.
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Lemma 11. Let θ1, . . . ,θn be i.i.d.U [0, 1] and let θ(1), . . . ,θ(n) be
their order statistics, θ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ θ(n). Then
E[θ(i)] = 1 −
i
n + 1 ,
var[θ(i)] =
i(n + 1 − i)
(n + 1)2(n + 2) ,
cov[θ(i),θ(j)] =
i(n + 1 − j)
(n + 1)2(n + 2) , i < j .
The proof is by calculation with the joint density function for
(θ(i),θ(j)). The import of the next lemma is that for large n the op-
timal number of users who will participate is with high probability
close to ((1 − c)/2)n.
Lemma 12.
(i) Letm = an, 0 < a < 1. As n →∞,
E(д(m)) ∼ 1 − 2a,
var(д(m)) ∼ 4a(1 − a)
n
.
(ii) Let
m(θ ) = arg max
m∈N (1 − ρ
m )
m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) −mc .
For any ϵ > 0, there is a large enough n such that
m(θ ) <
(
1−c
2 − ϵ
)
n =⇒ д(θ (( 1−c
2 −ϵ
)
n
) ) < c + ϵ,
m(θ ) >
(
1−c
2 + ϵ
)
n =⇒ д(θ (( 1−c
2 +ϵ
)
n
) ) > c − ϵ .
(iii) As n →∞,
P
(
m(θ ) <
(
1−c
2 − ϵ
)
n
)
∼ O (1/n) ,
P
(
m(θ ) >
(
1−c
2 + ϵ
)
n
)
∼ O (1/n) .
Proof. For (i), directly compute E(д(m)) and var(д(m)) accord-
ing to Lemma 11, we get
E(д(m)) ∼ 1 − 2a,
var(д(m)) ∼ 4a(1 − a)
n
.
For (ii), to prove
m(θ ) < ( 1−c2 − ϵ)n =⇒ д(θ(( 1−c2 −ϵ )n)
) < c + ϵ,
we will prove its equivalent statement
д(θ(( 1−c2 −ϵ )n)
) ≥ c + ϵ =⇒ m(θ ) ≥ ( 1−c2 − ϵ)n.
Suppose it is true that д(θ(( 1−c2 −ϵ )n)
) ≥ c + ϵ . For any 0 < m <
( 1−c2 − ϵ)n, if the platform user number increases fromm to ( 1−c2 −
ϵ)n, the increment of platform’s profit is
(1 − ρ( 1−c2 −ϵ )n )
( 1−c2 −ϵ )n∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) − ( 1−c2 − ϵ)nc
− (1 − ρm )
m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) +mc
≥ (1 − ρ( 1−c2 −ϵ )n )(( 1−c2 − ϵ)n −m)(c + ϵ)
− (( 1−c2 − ϵ)n −m)c
> 0 ,
since n →∞. Thus, it follows thatm(θ ) > ( 1−c2 − ϵ)n.
Similarly, to prove
m(θ ) > ( 1−c2 + ϵ)n =⇒ д(θ(( 1−c2 +ϵ )n)
) > c − ϵ
we will prove its equivalent statement
д(θ(( 1−c2 +ϵ )n)
) ≤ c − ϵ =⇒ m(θ ) ≤ ( 1−c2 + ϵ)n.
Suppose it is true that д(θ(( 1−c2 +ϵ )n)
) ≤ c − ϵ . For any ( 1−c2 + ϵ)n <
m ≤ n , if the platform user number increases fromm − 1 tom, the
increment of platform’s profit is
h(m) = ρm−1(1 − ρ)
m−1∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) + (1 − ρm )д(θ(m)) − c
≤ ρm−1(1 − ρ)m + (1 − ρm )(c − ϵ) − c
< 0,
since n →∞. Thus, it follows thatm(θ ) ≤ ( 1−c2 + ϵ)n
For (iii) we use Chebyshev’s inequality. By (i) and (ii),
P
(
m(θ ) < ( 1−c2 − ϵ)n
)
≤ P
(
д(θ(( 1−c2 −ϵ )n)
) < c + ϵ
)
≤
var[д(θ(( 1−c2 −ϵ )n)
) − c − ϵ]
E2[д(θ(( 1−c2 −ϵ )n)
) − c − ϵ]
∼ O(1/n).
Similarly, by (i) and (ii),
P
(
m(θ ) > ( 1−c2 + ϵ)n
)
≤ P
(
д(θ(( 1−c2 +ϵ )n)
) > c − ϵ
)
≤
var[д(θ(( 1−c2 −ϵ )n)
) − c + ϵ]
E2[д(θ(( 1−c2 −ϵ )n)
) − c + ϵ]
∼ O(1/n). □
Now we will prove the theorem.
Proof. When n →∞, the platform’s uniform pricing problem
becomes
max
θ¯
n(1 − θ¯ )θ¯ − n(1 − θ¯ )c .
It’s a quadratic function and the optimal threshold is θ¯∗ = 1+c2 and
the resulting maximal profit is ( 1−c2 )2n.
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Note that ΠD ≥ ΠU , we only need to show that ΠD is bounded
by ( 1−c2 )2n. We use below that д ≤ 1.∫
max
m∈N (1 − ρ
m )
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
)
−mc dFn (θ )
= E
[
max
m∈N (1 − ρ
m )
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
)
−mc
]
≤ P
(
|m(θ ) − 1−c2 n | > ϵn
)
n
+ E
 maxm: |m− 1−c2 n | ≤ϵn(1 − ρm )
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
) .
By Lemma 12(iii), the first part is ∼ O(1). Now we compute the
second fart as follows,
E
 maxm: |m− 1−c2 n | ≤ϵn(1 − ρm )
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
)
≤ E

( 1−c2 −ϵ )n∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) + 2ϵn
 .
Using Lemma 11, we see that the second part is ∼ ( 1−c2 )2n. There-
fore, the profit achieved by the differentiated pricing scheme is
∼ ( 1−c2 )2n. □
C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof. As n →∞
Eθ (Π) = Eθ
(
max
{πi , i ∈N }
∑
i ∈N
πi
(
θi (1 − ρ
∑
i πi ) − c
))
∼ Eθ
(
max
{πi , i ∈N }
∑
i ∈N
πi
(
θi − c
))
= Eθ
( ∑
i :{θi ≥c }
(θi − c)
)
= n
∫ 1
c
(θ − c)dF (θ )
=
(1 − c)2
2 n.
Thus,
PoI = lim
n→∞
Eθ (Π)
ΠU
=
(1−c)2
2 n
( 1−c2 )2n
= 2. □
D PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We first prove some lemmas.
Lemma 13.
(i) Let
m(θ ) = arg max
m∈N log(m)
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
)
−mc .
Then for any ϵ > 0, there is a large enough n such that
m(θ ) < ( 12 − ϵ)n =⇒ д(θ(( 12−ϵ )n)
) < ϵ,
m(θ ) > ( 12 + ϵ)n =⇒ д(θ(( 12+ϵ )n)
) > −ϵ .
(ii) As n →∞,
P
(
m(θ ) < ( 12 − ϵ)n
)
∼ O(1/n),
P
(
m(θ ) > ( 12 + ϵ)n
)
∼ O(1/n).
Proof. For (i), to prove
m(θ ) < ( 12 − ϵ)n =⇒ д(θ(( 12−ϵ )n)
) < ϵ,
we will prove its equivalent statement
д(θ(( 12−ϵ )n)
) ≥ ϵ =⇒ m(θ ) ≥ ( 12 − ϵ)n.
Suppose it is true that д(θ(( 12−ϵ )n)
) ≥ ϵ . For any 0 < m < ( 12 −ϵ)n, if
the subscriber number increases fromm to ( 12 − ϵ)n, the increment
of platform’s profit is
log(( 12 − ϵ)n)
( 12−ϵ )n∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) − ( 12 − ϵ)nc
− log(m)
m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) +mc
=
(
log(( 12 − ϵ)n) − log(m)
) m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
+ log(( 12 − ϵ)n)
( 12−ϵ )n∑
i=m+1
д(θ(i)) − (( 12 − ϵ)n −m)c
> (( 12 − ϵ)n −m)
(
ϵ log(( 12 − ϵ)n) − c
)
> 0,
since n →∞. Thus, it follows thatm(θ ) ≥ ( 12 − ϵ)n.
Similarly, to prove
m(θ ) > ( 12 + ϵ)n =⇒ д(θ(( 12+ϵ )n)
) > −ϵ,
we will prove its equivalent statement
д(θ(( 12+ϵ )n)
) ≤ −ϵ =⇒ m(θ ) ≤ ( 12 + ϵ)n.
Suppose it is true that д(θ(( 12+ϵ )n)
) ≤ −ϵ . For any ( 12 +ϵ)n < m ≤ n ,
if the subscriber number increases from ( 12 +ϵ)n tom, the increment
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of platform’s profit is
log(m)
m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) −mc − log(( 12 + ϵ)n)
( 12+ϵ )n∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
+ ( 12 − ϵ)nc
=
(
log(m) − log(( 12 + ϵ)n)
) ( 12+ϵ )n∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
+ log(m)
m∑
i=( 12−ϵ )n+1
д(θ(i)) − (m − ( 12 + ϵ)n)c
<
(
log(m) − log(( 12 + ϵ)n)
)
( 12 + ϵ)n
− log(m)(m − ( 12 − ϵ)n)ϵ
< 0,
since n →∞. Thus, it follows thatm(θ ) ≤ ( 12 + ϵ)n
For (ii) we use Chebyshev’s inequality. By (i) and Lemma 12(i),
P
(
m(θ ) < ( 12 − ϵ)n
)
≤ P
(
д(θ(( 12−ϵ )n)
) − ϵ < 0
)
≤
var[д(θ(( 12−ϵ )n)
) − ϵ]
E2[д(θ(( 12−ϵ )n)
) − ϵ]
∼ O(1/n).
Similarly, by (i) and Lemma 12(i),
P
(
m(θ ) > ( 12 + ϵ)n
)
≤ P
(
д(θ(( 12+ϵ )n)
) + ϵ > 0
)
≤
var[д(θ(( 12+ϵ )n)
) + ϵ]
E2[д(θ(( 12+ϵ )n)
) + ϵ]
∼ O(1/n). □
Now we will prove the theorem.
Proof. When n →∞, the platform’s uniform pricing problem
becomes
max
θ¯
θ¯ log(n(1 − θ¯ )).
The optimal threshold is θ¯∗ = 12 and the resulting maximal profit isn
4 log(n2 ).
Note that ΠD ≥ ΠU , we only need to show that ΠD is bounded
by n4 log(n2 ). We use below that д ≤ 1.∫
max
m∈N log(m)
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
)
−mc dFn (θ )
= E
[
max
m∈N log(m)
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
)
−mc
]
≤ E
[
max
m∈N log(m)
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
)]
≤ P
(
|m(θ ) − 12n | > ϵn
)
n log(n)
+ E
 maxm: |m− 12n | ≤ϵn log(m)
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
)
By Lemma 13(ii), the first part is ∼ O(log(n)). Now we compute
the second fart as follows,
E
 maxm: |m− 12n | ≤ϵn logm
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
)
≤ log
(
( 12 + ϵ)n
)
·
E
 maxm: |m− 12n | ≤ϵn
( ( 12−ϵ )n∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) +
m∑
i=1+( 12−ϵ )n
д(θ(i))
)
≤ log
(
( 12 + ϵ)n
)
E

( 12−ϵ )n∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) + 2ϵn
 .
Using Lemma 11, we see that the second part is ∼ n4 log(n2 ). There-
fore, the profit achieved by the differentiated pricing scheme is
∼ n4 log(n2 ). □
E PROOF OF COROLLARY 6
Similar to (22), the platform’s optimization problem under com-
plete information is
max
m∈N
(
m
m∑
i=1
θi −mc
)
. (31)
Similar to (23), the platform’s optimization problem under incom-
plete information and differentiated pricing scheme is∫
max
m∈N
(
m
m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) −mc
)
dFn (θ ). (32)
Similar to (24), the platform’s optimization problem under incom-
plete information and uniform pricing scheme is
max
θ¯
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )2n2 − n(1 − θ¯ )c . (33)
As n →∞, (33) becomes,
max
θ¯
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )2n2.
The optimum is attained at θ¯∗ → 13 and the optimal profit is ∼
4/27n2. This proves the first part of Corollary 6. For the rest part,
we introduce some Lemmas.
10
Lemma 14.
(i) Let
m(θ ) = arg max
m∈N m
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) − c
)
,
h(m) =
[
m
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) − c
)]
−
[
(m − 1)
(m−1∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) − c
)]
=mд(θ(m)) +
m−1∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) − c .
Then form ≥ 1,
m(θ ) ≥ m =⇒ h(m) ≥ 0 or д(θ(m)) ≥ 0,
m(θ ) < m =⇒ h(m) < 0.
(ii) Form = an, 0 < a < 1,
Eh(m) ∼ (2 − 3a)an.
(iii) Supposem = ( 23 − ϵ)n, where ϵ is a small positive number. Then
P(h(m) ≤ 0) ≤ var[h(m)](3ϵ)2( 23 − ϵ)2n2
.
Supposem = ( 23 + ϵ)n. Then
P(h(m) ≥ 0) ≤ var[h(m)](3ϵ)2( 23 + ϵ)2n2
.
(iv) Form = an, 0 < a < 1,
var[h(m)] = O(n).
(v) Form = an, a ≥ 2/3 + ϵ ,
P(д(m) ≥ 0) = O(1/n).
(vi)
P
(
|m(θ ) − 23n | > ϵn
)
= O(1/n).
Proof. The truth of (i) is straightforward. Note thatm(θ ) is the
greatestm such that h(m) ≥ 0 and note that h(m) increases inm
when д(θ(m)) is nonnegative and decreases inm when д(θ(m)) is
negative.
For (ii), recall that д(θi ) = 2θi − 1. Thus, E[д(θ(i))] = 2(1− i/(n +
1)) − 1 and hence
E
[
mд(θ(m)) +
m−1∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
]
= 2m
(
1 − m
n + 1
)
−m
+
m−1∑
i=1
2
(
1 − i
n + 1
)
− (m − 1)
= −3m
2 − 2mn − 3m + n + 1
n + 1
and so ifm = an
E[h(m)] ∼ (2 − 3a)an.
For (iii) we use Chebyshev’s inequality. Supposem ≤ ( 23 −ϵ)n. Then
P(h(m) ≤ 0) = P(h(m) − E[h(m)] ≤ −E[h(m)])
≤ P(|h(m) − E[h(m)]| ≥ E[h(m)])
≤ var[h(m)](3ϵ)2( 23 − ϵ)2n2
.
Supposem ≥ ( 23 + ϵ)n. Then
P(h(m) ≥ 0) = P(h(m) − E[h(m)] ≥ −E[h(m)])
≤ P(|h(m) − E[h(m)]| ≥ −E[h(m)])
≤ var[h(m)](3ϵ)2( 23 + ϵ)2n2
.
For (iv) we find var[h(m)]. This is
var[h(m)] =m2 var[д(θ(m))] +
m−1∑
i=1
var[д(θ(i))]
+ 2m
m−1∑
i=1
cov[д(θ(i)),д(θ(m))]
+ 2
∑
1≤i<j≤m−1
cov[д(θ(i)),д(θ(j))].
An evaluation of this form = an gives
var[h(m)] ∼
(
28a3
3 − 9a
4
)
n.
The term in parentheses is positive.
For (v), recall that д(θm ) = 2θm − 1. If m ≥ ( 23 + ϵ)n, then
E[д(θ(m))] = 2(1−m/(n+1))−1 < 0 and var[д(θ(m))] = 4 m(n+1−m)(n+1)2(n+2) .
It follows that
P(д(θ(m)) > 0) = P(д(θ(m)) − E[д(θ(m))] > −E[д(θ(m))])
≤ P(|д(θ(m)) − E[д(θ(m))]| ≥ −E[д(θ(m))])
≤ var[д(θ(m))]
E2[д(θ(m))]
=
4 m(n+1−m)(n+1)2(n+2)
(1 − 2m/(n + 1))2 .
Thus, whenm = an ≥ ( 23 + ϵ)n, we have P(д(θ(m)) > 0) ∼ O(1/n).
For (vi), note that
P
(
|m(θ ) − 23n | > ϵn
)
= P
(
m(θ ) > ( 23 + ϵ)n
)
+ P
(
m(θ ) < ( 23 − ϵ)n
)
≤ P
(
h(( 23 + ϵ)n) ≥ 0 or д(θ(m)) ≥ 0
)
+ P
(
h(( 23 − ϵ)n) < 0
)
≤ P
(
h(( 23 + ϵ)n) ≥ 0) + P(д(θ(m)) ≥ 0)
+ P
(
h(( 23 − ϵ)n) < 0
)
.
From this, (vi) follows from application of (iii), (iv) and (v). □
Now we prove the theorem.
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Proof. We use below that д ≤ 1. Now∫
max
m∈N m
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) − c
)
dFn (θ )
= E
[
max
m∈N m
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) − c
)]
≤ E
[
max
m∈N m
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
)]
≤ P
(
|m(θ ) − 23n | > ϵn
)
n2
+ E
 maxm: |m− 23n | ≤ϵnm
( m∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
)
≤ P
(
|m(θ ) − 23n | > ϵn
)
n2
+ ( 23 + ϵ)nE
2ϵn +
( 23−ϵ )n∑
i=1
д(θ(i))
 .
Using Lemma 14 (v), and the fact that ϵ is arbitrary, we see that the
right hand side ∼ (4/27)n2. □
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Proof. Assume user’ utility is given by (25). As n →∞,
Eθ (Π) = Eθ
(
max
m∈N v(m)
m∑
i=1
θi −mc
)
=
∫ (
max
m∈N v(m)
m∑
i=1
θi −mc
)
dFn (θ )
∼ v(n)
∫ n∑
i=1
θidF
n (θ ) − nc
∼ 12nv(n).
Now we compute the maximum profit under incomplete infor-
mation and uniform price,
ΠU = max
θ¯ ∈[0,1]
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )nv(n(1 − θ¯ )) − θ¯v(n(1 − θ¯ ))c .
We can omit the second part as n →∞,
lim
n→∞ΠU = maxθ¯ ∈[0,1]
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )nv(n(1 − θ¯ )).
The price of information is
PoI = lim
n→∞
1
2v(n)
max
θ¯ ∈[0,1]
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )v(n(1 − θ¯ )) .
Note that v(x) is concave and hence V (n(1 − θ¯ )) ≥ (1 − θ¯ )v(n). It
follows that
max
θ¯ ∈[0,1]
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )v(n(1 − θ¯ ))
≥ max
θ¯ ∈[0,1]
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )2v(n) = 427v(n). (34)
Therefore,
PoI = lim
n→∞
1
2v(n)
max
θ¯ ∈[0,1]
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )V (n(1 − θ¯ )) ≤
1
2v(n)
4
27v(n)
=
27
8 .
Note that
max
θ¯ ∈[0,1]
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )v(n(1 − θ¯ )) ≤ max
θ¯ ∈[0,1]
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )V (n) = 14v(n). (35)
Therefore,
PoI = lim
n→∞
1
2v(n)
max
θ¯ ∈[0,1]
θ¯ (1 − θ¯ )v(n(1 − θ¯ )) ≥
1
2v(n)
1
4v(n)
= 2.
Note that equality in (34) holds for linear function, thus PoI for
linear utility model (5) is 27/8. Equality in (35) holds for logarithm
function as n →∞, that is, for any θ¯ ∈ [0, 1]
lim
n→∞
v(n(1 − θ¯ ))
v(n) = 1.
Thus, PoI for logarithm utility model (4) is 2. □
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(26) can be written as
max
m1,m2
m1
(( m1∑
i=1
θi +
n1+m2∑
i=n1+1
θi
)
− m1 +m2
m1
c
)
. (36)
We first maximize the term in the bracket of (36). Note that
B(m1,m2) =
( m1∑
i=1
θi +
n1+m2∑
i=n1+1
θi
)
− m1 +m2
m1
c
≤
( n1∑
i=1
θi +
n1+m2∑
i=n1+1
θi
)
− n1 +m2
n1
c .
We only need to maximize B(n1,m2) over m2. B(n1,m2) is maxi-
mized form2 = m¯2 where m¯2 is the largest user numberm2 such
that θn1+m2 ≥ c/n1. Thus, if B(n1,m¯2) > 0 then the maximal profit
is n1B(n1,m¯2) which is achieved form1 = n1 andm2 = m¯2. Other-
wise, the maximal profit is 0 and it is optimal to include no user.
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We use k to denote n1/n2 throoughout the proof. It is straight-
forward to check that the thresholds θ¯∗1 = min{ 23 −
√
k (4k+3)
6k , 0}
and θ¯∗2 =
1
2 solve the following optimization problem,
max
θ¯1, θ¯2∈[0,1]
kn2(1 − θ¯1)(θ¯1(1 − θ¯1)kn2)n2)
+ n2(1 − θ¯2)(θ¯2(1 − θ¯1)kn2).
Direct calculation will prove the first part of the theorem.
Now we prove that ΠD ∼ (10). Since ΠD ≥ ΠU , we only need
to prove that ΠD is bounded above by (10). Define η1 = 1 − θ¯∗1 =
min{ 13 +
√
k (4k+3)
6k , 1} and η2 = 1 − θ¯∗2 = 12 . We first prove some
lemmas.
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Lemma 15.
(i) Letm1 = a1n1,m2 = a2n2, and
h1(m1,m2) =
m1∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) +
m2∑
i=1
д(θ(n1+i)) − c +m1д(θ(m1)),
h2(m1,m2) =m1д(θ(n1+m2)) − c .
Then, for any a1 ∈ (0, 1) and a2 ∈ (0, 1),
E[h1(m1,m2)] ∼ n2(−3ka21 − a22 + 2ka1 + a2),
E[h2(m1,m2)] ∼ n2(−2ka1a2 + ka1).
and
var[h1(m1,m2)] = O(1/n2), var[h2(m1,m2)] = O(1/n2).
(ii) Let
f1(a2) = min{
k +
√
k2 + 3ka2 − 3ka22
3k , 1},
Then, as n2 →∞,{
0 < a1 < f1(a2) =⇒ E[h1(m1,m2)] > 0
f1(a2) < a1 ≤ 1 =⇒ E[h1(m1,m2)] < 0.
and {
0 < a2 < 12 =⇒ E[h2(m1,m2)] > 0
1
2 < a2 ≤ 1 =⇒ E[h2(m1,m2)] < 0.
(iii) Let R(ϵ1, ϵ2) be a region in [0, 1]2. R(ϵ1, ϵ2) is defined by the
following system of inequalities,{
f1(a2) − ϵ1 ≤ a1 ≤ f1(a2) + ϵ1,
1
2 − ϵ2 ≤ a2 ≤ 12 + ϵ2.
(37)
Then, for arbitrary ϵ > 0, there are some ϵ1, ϵ2 > 0 such that
R(ϵ1, ϵ2) ⊂ [η1 − ϵ,η1 + ϵ] × [η2 − ϵ,η2 + ϵ].
Proof. (i) can be proved by applying the results of Lemma 11
directly, we omit the detailed calculation. Straightforward calcula-
tion shows (ii) is true. (iii) follows from the facts that f1(a2) = η1
when a2 = 12 and that f1(a2) is continuous. □
Now we prove the Theorem.
Proof. Let
(m1(θ ), (m2(θ ))
= arg max
(m1,m2)
[
m1
( m1∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) +
m2∑
i=1
д(θ(n1+i))
)
− (m1 +m2)c
]
,
and (a1(θ ),a2(θ )) = (m1(θ )/n1, (m2(θ )/n2). Note that д ≤ 1. Then,∫
max
m1,m2
m1
( m1∑
i=1
д(θ(n1+i)) +
m2∑
i=1
д(θ2(i))
)
− (m1 +m2)c
)
dFn (θ )
≤ E
[
max
m1,m2
m1
( m1∑
i=1
д(θ1(i)) +
m2∑
i=1
д(θ2(i))
)]
≤ P
(
|m1(θ ) − η1n1 | > ϵn1 or |m2(θ ) − η2n2 | > ϵn2
)
·
k(k + 1)n22+
E
[
max
m1:|m1−η1n1 |≤ϵn1
m2:|m1−η2n2 |≤ϵn2
m1
( m1∑
i=1
д(θ(i)) +
n1+m2∑
i=n1+1
д(θ(i))
)]
.
Note that the second part
E
[
max
m1:|m1−η1n1 |≤ϵn1
m2:|m1−η2n2 |≤ϵn2
m1
( m1∑
i=1
д(θ1(i)) +
m2∑
i=1
д(θ2(i))
)]
≤ (η1 + ϵ)n1·
E
[
2ϵn1 +
(η1−ϵ )n1∑
i=1
д(θ1(i)) + 2ϵn2 +
(η2−ϵ )n2∑
i=1
д(θ2(i)))
]
∼ kη1(k(1 − η1)η1 + (1 − η2)η2)n22
The last step is derived by Lemma 11 and the fact that ϵ is arbitrary
small. If we can further show that for arbitrary ϵ > 0,
P
(
|m1(θ ) − η1n1 | > ϵn1 or |m2(θ ) − η2n2 | > ϵn2
)
∼ O(1/n2),
or
P
(
|m1(θ ) − η1n1 | ≤ ϵn1 and |m2(θ ) − η2n2 | ≤ ϵn2
)
∼ 1 −O(1/n2),
then the first part is ∼ O(n2) which is dominated by the second
part and hence the theorem is true.
To prove the statement above, wewill first show that for arbitrary
ϵ1, ϵ2 > 0, (a1(θ ),a2(θ )) is in the region R(ϵ1, ϵ2) defined in Lemma
15(iii) with probability ∼ 1 −O(1/n2).
For any a2 ∈ [0, 1], from Lemma 15(i), (ii), and Chebyshev’s
inequality it follows that
P
(
a1(θ ) ∈ [f1(a2(θ )) − ϵ1, f1(a2(θ )) + ϵ1]
a2(θ ) = a2)
∼ 1 −O( 1
n2
)
The detailed proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 6, we do not
repeat it here. By integral, we have
P
(
a1(θ ) ∈ [f1(a2(θ )) − ϵ1, f1(a2(θ )) + ϵ1]
)
∼ 1 −O( 1
n2
).
Similarly, for any a1 ∈ [0, 1], from Lemma 15(i), (ii), and Cheby-
shev’s inequality it follows that
P
(
a2(θ ) ∈ [ 12 − ϵ2, 12 + ϵ2]
a1(θ ) = a1) ∼ 1 −O( 1n2 ).
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By integral, we have
P
(
a2(θ ) ∈ [ 12 − ϵ2, 12 + ϵ2]
)
∼ 1 −O( 1
n2
).
Thus,
P
(
(a1(θ ),a2(θ )) ∈ R(ϵ1, ϵ2)
)
∼ 1 −O( 1
n2
).
It follows from Lemma 15(iii) that for arbitrary ϵ > 0, there are
some ϵ1, ϵ2 > 0 such that
R(ϵ1, ϵ2) ⊂ [η1 − ϵ,η1 + ϵ] × [η2 − ϵ,η2 + ϵ].
Therefore,
P
(
|m1(θ ) − η1n1 | ≤ ϵn1 and |m2(θ ) − η2n2 | ≤ ϵn2
)
∼ 1 −O(1/n2). □
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Proof. As n →∞,
Eθ (Π) = E
[
max
m1,m2
m1
( m1∑
i=1
θi +
n1+m2∑
i=n1+1
θi
)
− (m1 +m2)c
]
∼ E
[
max
m1,m2
m1
( m1∑
i=1
θi +
n1+m2∑
i=n1+1
θi
)]
= k(k + 1)n22.
Since EU is given by (10), the price of information is
PoI = 54k(k + 1)
(2k + √k(4k + 3))(3 + 2k + √k(4k + 3)) ,
when k ≥ 14 , and
PoI = 2(k + 1),
when 0 < k < 14 . The derivative of PoI with respect to k is less than
zero, hence it decreases with k . Replacing k by n1/n2 will prove the
theorem. □
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